

Message Text

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STATE FOR ACDA FOR NEWHOUSE

USICA FOR PGM/PPE LAFE ALLEN; EU FOR COHEN

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TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: END OF ROUND XV PRESS CONFERENCES

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0442

1. REFTEL REPORTS TEXT OF WESTERN PRESS
CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT BY NETHERLANDS REP DE VOS.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS OF THAT PRESS CONFERENCE ARE
REPORTED IN PARA 2 BELOW. PARA 3 BELOW IS TEXT OF
STATEMENT BY SOVIET DEL SPOKESMAN WHO SUMMARIZED SOVIET
REP TARASOV'S PLENARY STATEMENT AT BEGINNING OF EASTERN
PRESS CONFERENCE. EASTERN PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY
POLISH REP STRULAK AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ARE REPORTED
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IN PARAS 4 AND 5 BELOW.

WESTERN END OF ROUND XV PRESS CONFERENCE
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
(NETHERLANDS REP DE VOS)

1. Q. (IZVESTIYA - PEREVETSCHIKOV) ON PAGE THREE OF YOUR

STATEMENT YOU SAY "IT WOULD NOT PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM RETURNING TO ITS STARTING LEVEL." AS FAR AS I KNOW IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS THERE IS A POSITION THAT THE TROOPS WITHDRAWN SHOULD NOT BE RETURNED AGAIN AND THEIR NUMBER REDUCED SHOULD NOT BE RESTORED. WOULD YOU COMMENT ON THE COMBINATION OF THESE PROPOSALS?

A. IN GENERAL THE EASTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDE THAT, IF ON EITHER SIDE AFTER AGREED REDUCTIONS THERE WOULD BE SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS, OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE SAME SIDE OR GROUPING COULD MAKE UP FOR SUCH REDUCTIONS UP TO A MAXIMUM PRE-REDUCTION LEVEL AND THEY SHOULD NOT EXCEED THEIR ORIGINAL LEVEL IN MAKING UP SUCH REDUCTIONS. SO IF THERE WERE SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BY POLAND, THE GDR OR CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON THE EASTERN SIDE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE UP FOR SUCH REDUCTIONS UP TO A MAXIMUM OF ITS ORIGINAL PRE-REDUCTION LEVEL.

2. Q. (POLISH NEWS AGENCY RAYSACHER) BUT THERE IS ASYMMETRY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN SITUATIONS ON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AND NUMBERS IN THE CASE OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IT SEEMS TO ME AS I UNDERSTAND IT?

A. YOU MEAN THERE IS ASYMMETRY IN OBLIGATIONS? THE OBLIGATIONS ARE FORMALLY IDENTICAL, BUT IN PRACTICAL TERMS THEY WOULD WORK OUT DIFFERENTLY FOR EACH SIDE, AS I HAVE UNCLASSIFIED

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EXPLAINED. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPORTANT FACTORS OF GEOGRAPHY AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES WHICH THE EAST HAS. THEY DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE MAJOR EASTERN POWER, THE SOVIET UNION, IS IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTION AREA AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS VERY POWERFUL FORCES ON ITS OWN TERRITORY AND THOSE FORCES WOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN SIZE BY A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THAT IS A FACTOR WHICH ONE HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AND WHICH FULLY JUSTIFIES THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE COLLECTIVITY -- THAT IS COLLECTIVE CEILINGS ON WESTERN FORCES SO THAT THE WEST WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE POST-REDUCTION LEVELS. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE WOULD BE A SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA AND AS A COUNTERPART WE WOULD ACCEPT THIS LIMITATION ON THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE AREA. WITHOUT THIS LIMITATION WE WOULD HAVE A SITUATION WHERE THE SOVIET UNION COULD INCREASE ITS FORCES IN THE TERRITORY

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IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WHILE IT
WOULD BE AT THE SAME TIME IN A POSITION TO INCREASE ITS
FORCES WITHIN THE AREA.

3. Q. (LOS ANGELES TIMES - COOK) WOULD THE SAME APPLY TO THE
UNITED STATES? FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE UNITED STATES WANTED
TO MAKE UP FOR A REDUCTION OF DUTCH FORCES, WOULD IT BE
ABLE TO DO SO UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSALS?

A. I HOPE YOU ARE NOT SUGGESTING AN ACTUAL CASE* INDEED,
IT WOULD HAVE THE SAME EFFECT ON THE UNITED STATES.

4. Q. (ADN - GDR NEWS AGENCY - KOSCHAK) CAN WE REGARD YOUR
STATEMENT AS THE OFFICIAL WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN
PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8? IN THE FIRST PART OF YOUR STATEMENT
YOU SAY THAT THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WILL EXAMINE THE
PROPOSALS BUT LATER ON YOU GO INTO DETAIL AND ARRIVE AT
THE CONCLUSION THAT YOU WELCOME THE PROPOSALS. IS THIS
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THE DEFINITIVE RESPONSE OR WILL THAT COME LATER?

A. YOU WILL RECALL THAT I STARTED OUT BY POINTING OUT THAT
WE ARE STILL EXAMINING THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. IT WOULD BE

PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT --AT THIS STAGE -- ABOUT WHEN THE WESTERN REPLY TO THESE PROPOSALS WILL BE MADE.

5. Q. (CBS - REED) IN OTHER WORDS, YOU FEEL THAT THIS ROUND, THEN, HAS BROUGHT MORE PROGRESS AND MOVEMENT THAN ANY OTHER ROUND?

A. WELL, CERTAINLY AS FAR AS THE EAST IS CONCERNED, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IT HAS REALLY MOVED, THAT IS, MADE A MOVE OF SIGNIFICANCE IN THE ENTIRE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. SO IF YOU LOOK AT THE SITUATION FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW, WE CERTAINLY HAVE HAD MORE MOVEMENT THAN BEFORE WHEN THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT AT ALL ON THE PART OF THE EAST.

6. Q. (LOS ANGELES TIME - COOK) WHEN YOU SPEAK OF AN OUTCOME OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, WHAT KIND OF A DISPARITY DO THE NATO POWERS HAVE IN MIND? 25,000? IS THAT A REASONABLE FIGURE REGARDING APPROXIMATE PARITY?

A. WELL, AS AN OUTCOME WE ARE FOR FULL PARITY IN MANPOWER.

Q. YOU SEEM TO BE CALLING FOR AN OUTCOME OF APPROXIMATE PARITY.

A. THAT MUST BE TAKEN IN THE WIDER SENSE AND INCLUDE ARMAMENTS. ON MANPOWER WE HAVE ALWAYS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE ABSOLUTE PARITY AT THE LEVEL OF A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING OF 700,000 GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

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7. Q. (CBS - REED) WOULD YOU SAY THERE IS A DISCREPANCY ON THE ORDER OF 100,000 IN THE FIGURES THEY HAVE SUBMITTED AND WHAT YOU HAVE?

A. WE HAVE ALWAYS TRIED TO AVOID GOING INTO SPECIFIC FIGURES HERE IN THE DISCUSSION (IN PRESS CONFERENCES) REGARDING THE DATA DISCUSSIONS. BUT I CAN SAY IT IS CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN 100,000 AS YOU MAY BE AWARE FROM FIGURES WE TABLED BY EACH SIDE IN THE PAST.

8. Q. (ISVESTIYA - PEREVETSCHIKOV) HOW CAN YOU PROVE THIS DISCREPANCY IN THE FIGURES?

A. WE HAVE GOOD FIGURES AND WE HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN OUR OWN DATA ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE RESULTS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION UP TO NOW HAVE GIVEN US NO REASON TO CHANGE OR DIMINISH OUR CONFIDENCE IN FIGURES; THEY ARE THE RIGHT ONES.

QA. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE SOURCES; (LAUGHTER) WHERE ARE THE SOURCES FROM WHICH THESE DISCREPANCIES COME FROM?

A. IN THE COURSE OF THE DATA DISCUSSIONS UP TO NOW, IT SEEMS TO US THE SOURCES MAY BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO A DIFFERENT APPLICATION BY THE TWO SIDES OF THE DEFINITION OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY MANPOWER. BEYOND THIS -- WHICH IS A COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE SUBJECT -- IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO GO INTO DETAIL AT THIS MOMENT.

9. Q. (POLISH NEWS AGENCY - RAYSACHER) IS IT NOT SO THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS NOT THE STARTING POINT FOR THE REDUCTIONS PROCESS BUT THE END RESULT? CAN YOU GIVE ME AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION?

A. YOU HAVE TO KNOW WHERE YOU START IF YOU ARE GOING SOMEWHERE. YOU MUST HAVE CLEAR REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS AND UNCLASSIFIED

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FOR THAT WE HAVE TO KNOW, NOT ONLY WHERE YOU END UP BUT WHERE YOU START. I DON'T FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION, MAYBE YOU COULD ELABORATE A LITTLE BIT?

Q. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHEN BOTH SIDES ARE READY TO ACCEPT THAT THE END RESULT OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS MUST BE A COMMON CEILING OF 700,000 IN GROUND FORCES, THEN THAT'S A BIG THING, AFTER SO MANY DISCUSSIONS HERE. BUT QUARRELING ABOUT THIS STARTING POINT -- IT IS THE END RESULT THAT IS WHAT IS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE STARTING POINT.

A. DO YOU SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD IGNORE THE DISCREPANCIES AND THE EASTERN MANPOWER SUPERIORITIES WHICH ARE THERE ACCORDING TO OUR GOOD INFORMATION? DON'T YOU THINK THAT IF YOU START OFF ANY AGREEMENT ON THAT BASIS WHERE THERE ARE BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES ABOUT THE FACTS AND YOU DO NOT AGREE, THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BECOME A SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND CONTENTION? THIS WOULD BE A FACTOR MAKING FOR INSTABILITY RATHER THAN FOR STABILITY. THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES IS PREDICATED ON AN AGREEMENT ON DATA AND CLARIFICATION OF THE DATA BASE AND WE ARE CONVINCED THIS IS UNABOIDABLE AND A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY AGREEMENT. YOU MUST HAVE AGREEMENT ON THE FACTS.

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Q. IN MY OPINION, BOTH SIDES WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL
IF THE AGREED LEVEL OF 700,000 MEN IN GROUND FORCES WOULD
BE TAKEN AT THE END OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS. IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS THERE WERE DISCUSSED PREVIOUS STEPS FOR CONTROL
MEASURES AND THEY WILL BE DISCUSSED IN THE ENDING PHASES OF
THESE DISCUSSIONS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD
NOT BE BASED ON THE HONOR OF THE BOTH SIDES. IT SEEMS TO
ME THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH IS VERY DISTURBING FROM THE
POINT OF VIEW OF PROGRESS. THANK YOU.

A. IT IS COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE WEST IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS TO IGNORE THIS LARGE EASTERN MILITARY MANPOWER
SUPERIORITY. WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT CONTROL MEASURES IS ANOTHER
SUBJECT, THAT IS ASSOCIATED MEASURES WHICH ARE PART OF THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WEST HAS FROM
THE EARLY DAYS OF THESE TALKS TRIED TO APPROACH THE SUBJECT.
UNFORTUNATELY, SO FAR WE HAVE HAD NO RESPONSE FROM THE
EASTERN SIDE.

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10. Q. (UNIDENTIFIED) HAVE YOU GOT A DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND
OF TALKS?

A. THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION WILL BE ON THE 25TH OF
SEPTEMBER.

11. Q. (REUTERS - WIELAND) WHERE DO YOU SEE THE MAIN THRUST OF DISCUSSION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEXT ROUND? WHICH PARTICULAR AREAS WILL THE WESTERN SIDE BE FOCUSING ON?

A. AS I SAID, WE ARE STILL EXAMINING THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. WE HAVE NOT FINISHED OUR EVALUATION AND A NUMBER OF ASPECTS STILL NEED FURTHER CLARIFICATION. IT WOULD BE TOO EARLY TO SAY. THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATION WILL DETERMINE TO SOME EXTENT HOW WE WOULD LIKE TO CARRY OUT THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEXT ROUND. IN GENERAL, AS I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, THE CENTRAL ISSUE REMAINING IS DATA. WE STILL NEED TO DETERMINE THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING. WE CERTAINLY, ON OUR SIDE, WANT TO CONTINUE AND FINALLY TERMINATE THE DATA DISCUSSION SO THAT WE HAVE AN AGREED DATA BASE. OF COURSE, WE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED TO THE EAST, AS I SAID IN THE INITIAL STATEMENT, THERE ARE AREAS IN WHICH WE STILL HAVE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS IN WHICH THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PARITY AND COLLECTIVITY ON WHICH WE SEEM TO BE TENTATIVELY AGREED AT THIS MOMENT. WE WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF SUCH ASPECTS.

12. Q (AUSTRAIN PRESS AGENCY - ALTSCHUL) YOU REGARD THE DATA QUESTION AS A KEY QUESTION FOR FURTHER POSITIVE MOVES. DO YOU SEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF SOLVING THIS QUESTION? ARE UNCLASSIFIED

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YOU CONFIDENT IT CAN BE SOLVED?

A. WE WILL HAVE TO TRY. AS I SAID, THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES ARE NATURALLY PREDICATED ON AN AGREEMENT ON THAT ISSUE AND SO I WOULD ASSUME THAT NOT ONLY THE WEST IS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE DATA DISCUSSION IN A PRODUCTIVE WAY AND THAT WE WILL GET A FULL MEASURE OF COLLABORATION FROM THE EAST AND GIVEN GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES, IT SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND OUR MEANS TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT.

13. Q. (CBS - REED) HAS THE EAST ACCEPTED THE WESTERN DATA?

A. THEY HAVE NEVER CRITICIZED OUR DATA.

14. Q. (IZVESTIYA - PEREVETSCHIKOV) IF BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT AFTER REDUCTIONS 700,000 ARMED FORCES -- WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF SAYING THAT THE EAST NOW HAS ONE MILLION MORE?

A. THE TROUBLE IS THEY DO NOT PROPOSE TO WITHDRAW ONE MILLION BUT THEY PROPOSE TO REDUCE ONLY 105,000 MEN AND THAT IS NOT ENOUGH TO REACH 700,000 ACCORDING TO OUR

INFORMATION.

1. BUT IF THEY WITHDRAW AS AGREED WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

A. WE WANT TO BE SURE THAT THE EAST AGREES TO REDUCE AND THERE IS NO SUCH AGREEMENT. I AM CONVINCED THAT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT BASED ON SUCH A WIDE DIFFERENCE INSTEAD OF THE ACTUAL FACTS WOULD ONLY BECOME A SOURCE OF MIS-UNDERSTANDING AND CONTENTION. IT WOULD NOT BRING US THE ENHANCED SECURITY WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO PROMOTE THROUGH OUR NEGOTIATIONS. SO IT ALL COMES BACK TO THE POINT I MADE BEFORE THAT WE HAVE TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT ON DATA AND WE HAVE TO DRAW UP AN AGREED DATA BASE. THE WEST IS CERTAINLY PREPARED TO TACKLE THIS PROBLEM AS A PRIORITY.
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WE ARE SURE THE EAST WANTS TO DO THE SAME BECAUSE ITS POSITION IS BASED ON THE SAME ASSUMPTION, THAT IS, THAT THERE HAS TO BE AN AGREEMENT ON DATA.

15. Q. (REUTERS - WIELAND) I WONDER IF YOU COULD TELL US: THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS CONTAIN A LIMITATION CLAUSE OF A CERTAIN KIND THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CARRY THROUGH THE PHASE I REDUCTIONS IF THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS ARE NOT NEGOTIATED, THAT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER COULD WITHDRAW ITS AGREEMENT TO A PHASE I REDUCTION.

A. THAT I CANNOT DENY, INDEED. THERE IS A PROVISION IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO NULLIFY ITS PHASE I OBLIGATIONS IN CASE IT WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE WAY PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS WERE TO BE CARRIED OUT. THAT IS, WE FEEL, A VERY DESIRABLE PROVISION. IT WOULD PLACE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE VERY UNATTRACTIVE CHOICE BETWEEN TWO OPTIONS: ONE IS TO GIVE IN TO THE EAST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE OTHER OPTION

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IS THAT GAINS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE LOST.

Q. IS THIS AN OBLIGATION RETAINED ONLY BY THE SOVIET
UNION?

A. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. WE DO NOT
ENVISION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD WANT TO HAVE SUCH
A PROVISION.

END OF PRESS CONFERENCE

EASTERN END OF ROUND XV PRESS CONFERENCE
JULY 19, 1978

STATEMENT BY SOVIET DELEGATION SPOKESMAN A. SEMENNIKOV

IN THE SPEECH BY THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE USSR,
AMBASSADOR N.K. TARASOV, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT IN RECENT
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TIMES AT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS THERE HAS BEEN A TURN FOR
THE BETTER. THE SOCIALIST STATES MADE A DEFINITE CONTRIBUTION
TO INSURING SUCH A TURN FOR THE BETTER. THEIR PROPOSALS OF
THE 8TH OF JUNE OF THIS YEAR ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THE BROAD
COVERAGE OF THE QUESTIONS AND BY THE EXTENT WHICH THEY TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION AND
BY THEIR SEARCH FOR A REASONABLE COMPROMISE.

AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSION OF THESE PROPOSALS -- AND
ALSO OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF THE 19TH OF APRIL THIS YEAR
IN WHICH TO SOME EXTENT THERE HAS BEEN MADE A MOVE TO MEET
THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES -- IT

WAS POSSIBLE CONSIDERABLY TO ENLARGE THE LIST OF THOSE QUESTIONS ON WHICH MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED.

IN PARTICULAR, ALL STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA, IN ADDITION TO THAT, SHOULD REDUCE AGREED TYPES OF THEIR ARMAMENTS. IT HAS BEEN AGREED ALSO THAT THE REDUCTION OF FORCES SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN DEFINED TIME LIMITS AND THAT AFTER THAT THERE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED EQUAL COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES FOR THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES IN

CENTRAL EUROPE OF 900,000 MEN INCLUDING 700,000 IN GROUND FORCES FOR EACH SIDE. IN THE SPEECH, THERE WERE LISTED, CONCRETELY, AS WELL, MANY OTHER POINTS OF AGREEMENT REGARDING THE MODALITIES FOR THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THESE IMPORTANT MEASURES.

THE EHAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL NO SMALL NUMBER OF DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME ON THE ROAD TO AN AGREEMENT, THE EXTENT TO WHICH AGREEMENT HAS UNCLASSIFIED

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BEEN REACHED DOES SHOW THAT THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CAPABLE OF FINDING SOLUTIONS TO THE VERY COMPLICATED PROBLEMS WHEN THEY TAKE INTO ACCOUT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF EACH OTHER.

THE SOCIALIST STATES WILL IN THE FUTURE AS WELL AIM TO SEE TO IT THAT THE FUTURE AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD CONSTITUTE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY DETENTE AND TO LIMITING THE ARMS RACE; AND IT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO REINFORCING THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES. FOR THAT PURPOSE IT IS NECESSARY, ABOVE ALL, THAT ALL STATES, ALONG WITH THE USSR AND USA, SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES INDIVIDUALLY AND PROPORTIONATELY TO THEIR PRESENT NUMERICAL STRENGTH IN CENTRAL EUROPE; THEY SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTION OF THEIER ARMAMENTS AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE SET UP COLLECTIVE LEVELS WHICH COULD NOT BE USED IN THE FUTURE BY ANY ONE STATE IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES IT HAD BEFORE THE REDUCTIONS AS COUNTER-BALANCING ANY REDUCTION OF FORCES OF ITS ALLIES. THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION WILL, AS BEFORE, CONTINUE TO BE DECISIVE IN ITS OPPOSITION AGAINST ANY OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD EITHER FORMALLY OR IN FACT IMPOSE GREATER LIMITATIONS ON THE SOCIALIST STATES THAN ON THE NATO COUNTRIES. FOR THAT PURPOSE THE SOVIET UNION HAS EVERY HISTORICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION.

IN THE SPEECH OF N.K. TARASOV, IT WAS ONCE AGAIN SHOWN

HOW COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED ARE THE ASSERTIONS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS THAT THERE EXIST ALLEGED "DISPARITIES" IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE SO-CALLED "GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR" WHICH THE WEST STILL IS TRYING TO USE IN ORDER TO GET FOR ITSELF UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR NATO.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION ONCE AGAIN WARNED THAT THE CARRYING OUT OF THE PLANS WHICH ARE ONCE AGAIN HEARD IN NATO ABOUT UNCLASSIFIED

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DEPLOYING NEUTRON WEAPONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD STEP UP THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE PROCESSES IN EUROPE.

CALLING ON THE WESTERN STATES FOR A BUSINESS LIKE CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION QUOTED THE DECLARATION OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, LEONARD BREZHNEV, OF THE 25TH OF JUNE THIS YEAR, IN WHICH HE SAID, "THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE PROPOSING TO THEIR PARTNERS A REASONABLE AND REALISTIC COMPROMISE. IN TABLING THEIR PROPOSAL, THEY HAVE GONE MORE THAN THEIR HALF OF THE WAY. WE APPEAL TO THE COUNTRIES OF NATO: LET US AT LEAST GET DOWN TO BUSINESS. THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT UNDOUBTEDLY ALREADY EXISTS. EVERYTHING NOW DEPENDS ON THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE WEST."

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PRESS STATEMENT
BY THE HEAD OF THE POLISH DELEGATION ON 19 JULY, 1978
AT THE END OF THE XVTH ROUND OF THE VIENNA TALKS

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

THE ROUND UNDER REVIEW HAS BEEN AN INTERESTING AND
PRODUCTIVE ONE. THANKS TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE 4 SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES - DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, PRESENTED ON 8 JUNE, 1978,
WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT MANY ASPECTS OF THE EARLIER WESTERN
PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY THESE OF 19 APRIL 1978, THE DISCUSSION
IN THE XVTH ROUND ENABLED US TO SIGNIFICANTLY MOVE
FORWARD TO A MUTUAL ACCOMODATION OF THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS,
NECESSARY FOR AN AGREEMENT.

THIS CONCLUSION IS CERTAINLY SUBSTANTIATED BY THE
BASIC TRUTH THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE NOW COMMITTED
TO THE FINAL OUTCOME OF FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE
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THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVELS FOR
THE OVERALL NUMBER OF ARMED FORCES AT 900 THOUSAND MEN FOR
THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY STATES IN THE AGREED AREA,
INCLUDING 700 THOUSAND MEN IN GROUND FORCES. THIS, AS
YOU KNOW, WAS ORIGINALLY THE WESTERN IDEA.

IN ORDER TO REACH THIS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SUGGESTED IN THEIR PROPOSALS
CONCRETE COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS ON PRACTICALLY ALL MAJOR
ISSUES OF REDUCTION.

FIRST, WE HAVE INDICATED THE TOTAL VOLUME OF REDUCTION
OF GROUND FORCES IN ORDER TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING,
THE WARSAW TREATY STATES ARE READY TO REDUCE IN THE AREA
105 THOUSAND MEN, WHILE THE NATO WOULD BE REDUCING 91
THOUSAND. THESE ARE THE AMOUNTS CALCULATED ON THE BASIS
OF OFFICIAL DATA FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER PRESENTED BY
THE SIDES ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES, AND
WE PRESUME THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA WILL PRECEDE
A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE MAGNITUDE OF THESE MUTUAL REDUCTIONS
IS DETERMINED BY THE NUMBER THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS

ARE WILLING TO REDUCE. THROUGH THESE CONSIDERABLE CUTS WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DECREASE THE PRESENT HIGH FORCE CONCENTRATION OF THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY STATES IN THE HEART OF EUROPE. AT THE SAME TIME WE WOULD PRESERVE THE BASIC FORCE RELATIONSHIP ON WHICH NATIONAL AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY OF OUR NATIONS RELIES.

SECOND, WE HAVE DEFINED A VOLUME, SUBSTANCE AND MODALITIES OF REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST STAGE, IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION WOULD OPEN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION. THIS MEETS THE REQUIREMENT OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA WHICH - AS THEY HAVE SAID - UNCLASSIFIED

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SHOULD PERMIT THEM TO TAKE PART IN REDUCTION IN THE SECOND STAGE.

THE RECENTLY EXPRESSED READINESS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH REDUCTIONS PERMITTED THE SOVIET UNION TO PROVIDE UNDER THE 8 JUNE PROPOSALS FOR A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER VOLUME OF REDUCTION IN THE FIRST STAGE THAN THAT OF THE US. AS YOU KNOW, THE USSR WOULD REDUCE SOME 30 THOUSAND SOLDIERS, WHILE THE US ONLY ABOUT 14 THOUSAND. THE QUALITATIVE WEIGHT OF THE SOVIET OFFER IS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE: IN TOTAL THREE DIVISIONS, INCLUDING 1000 TANKS AND 250 MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES WHICH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM CENTRAL EUROPE. THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF THE SOVIET TANKS IN THE AREA WILL BE OBSERVED. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THIS IS AN OFFER OF SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO, AND - ONE MAY SAY - OF ADVANCE INVESTMENT INTO MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY IN ONE OF THE MOST SENSITIVE AREAS OF THE WORLD. IT IS ALSO A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS MEETING THE WESTERN THINKING ON THE PHASING OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION AND NEGOTIATIONS.

THIRD, THE SOCIALIST STATES PROPOSE THAT POST-REDUCTION CEILINGS ARE COLLECTIVE IN NATURE, AS THE WEST HAS WISHED. A FLEXIBLE MECHANISM OF POST-REDUCTION LIMITATIONS WOULD PERMIT COLLECTIVELY TO MAINTAIN THE COMMON FORCE LEVEL BY EACH OF THE TWO GROUPINGS AND SO TO INCREASE THE FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO COMPENSATE FOR POSSIBLE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BY THEIR ALLIES. THIS MECHANISM DISAVOWS NO ONE.

THE THE SAME TIME, WE PROPOSE TO RESTRAIN POSIBILITIES OF UNJUSTIFIABLE FORCE INCREASES BY ONE OR MORE STATES, IN CIRCUMVENTION OF THE REDUCTION OBLIGATION. THIS IS ALSO INTENDED TO BAR ANY MAJOR, DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WITHIN THE AREA UNDER COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, WHICH WOULD BE HARMFUL TO GENERAL STABILITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH OF OUR NATIONS. THE

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ENVISAGED LIMITATIONS ON POST-REDUCTION INCREASES WOULD WORK
EQUALLY FOR ALL STATES OF THE NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY.
WE BELIEVE NO PARTICULAR STATE SHOULD BE GRANTED
A PRIVILEGE TO REDUCE ONLY SYMBOLICALLY OR TO INCREASE
ITS FORCES EVEN ABOVE THE PRE-REDUCTION LEVEL. SUCH
AN ALLOWANCE COULD BRING ILL-EFFECTS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY.

FOURTH, WE PROPOSE THAT REDUCTION COMMITMENTS REGARDING
THE SECOND STAGE OF REDUCTIONS BE FORMULATED
IN THE FIRST AGREEMENT ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS, WHILE
THE DETAILS WOULD BE NEGOTIATED SUBSEQUENTLY. THIS IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING NOW OBTAINING AT THE
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PHASING OF REDUCTIONS. AT THE SAME
TIME WE MAINTAIN OUR VIEW THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
SHOULD REDUCE PROPORTIONATELY TO THEIR MILITARY
POTENTIALS TO REACH WITHIN 3 - 4 YEARS THE AGREED COMMON
LEVEL. THOSE WHO HAVE MORE WOULD REDUCE MORE. IN OUR VIEW,
THERE IS NO OTHER JUST SOLUTION POSSIBLE.

FIFTH, ALTHOUGH THE SOCIALIST STATES WOULD PREFER
TO HAVE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES ALONG WITH THEIR ARMS
AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, WE HAVE NOW TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION
THE WESTERN ARGUMENTATION THAT THIS WOULD BE TOO AMBITIOUS
AN ENDEAVOUR. WE HAVE THEREFORE AGREED TO DEAL WITH THE
PROBLEM SELECTIVELY AND ACCEPTED THE "MIXED PACKAGE"
APPROACH IN RESPECT OF ARMAMENTS REDUCTION AS SUGGESTED BY
THE WEST. IN THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE WE ALSO DO NOT ASK
FOR ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS FOR ARMAMENTS REDUCTION BY
THE WESTERN STATES OTHER THAN THE USA. WHAT WOULD BE NOT

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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

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ACCEPTABLE, HOWEVER, IS AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES WOULD AT ALL SHRINK FROM ANY COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN THE SECOND STAGE. THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENT OF MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS, UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND OF GENUINE MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

IN THE COURSE OF THE XVTH ROUND THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON ALL THE ABOVE MENTIONED ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE SOCIALIST STATES ON 8 JUNE, 1978. THE DELEGATIONS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES GAVE EXTENSIVE EXPLANATIONS IN REPLY TO POINTS RAISED BY OUR PARTNERS. WE INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THOSE, AND INDEED ALL OTHER POINTS OF CONCERN TO THE WEST, IN THE SPIRIT OF A TRUE SEARCH FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH, WE FELT, IS NOW CLEARLY WITHIN OUR REACH.

WE STRESSED IN THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE XVTH ROUND
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THAT OUR PROPOSAL WOULD NOT BRING ANY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE OR DISADVANTAGE TO ANY PARTICIPANT OF FUTURE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD PERMIT TO MAINTAIN THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF EVERY STATE, INCLUDING THE FLANK COUNTRIES.

WHILE EMBARKING UPON THE FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS WE SHOULD ALL HAVE CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS PICTURE OF:
A/ RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO REDUCTION PROCESS;
B/ POST-REDUCTION LIMITATIONS; AND
C/ THE FINAL OUTCOME IN THE FORM OF COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVEL OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

THUS THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND PEACE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED THROUGH A MUTUAL AND TRULY EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENT IN MILITARY DOMAIN. THIS IS, AS WE ALL AGREE, WHAT IS GREATLY NEEDED FOR OEPNING UP THE WAY TO FURTHER MILITARY DETENTE AND FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DETENTE ON OUR CONTINENT.

AN EARLY PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IS
INDEED GREATLY DESIRED IN VIEW OF THE GROWING IMPORTANCE
OF DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE FOR THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS
IN GENERAL AND OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR.
THE EXPECTATIONS FOR SUCH PROGRESS HAVE BEEN RECENTLY
STRESSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT
ITS SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT.

WE FEEL THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE DONE THEIR
BEST TO MEET THESE EXPECTATIONS. WE ARE NOW AWAITING
A MOVE ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN STATES WHICH WILL
MATCH OUR CONSTRUCTIVITY, FLEXIBILITY AND DESIRE FOR
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. THIS COULD ENABLE US SOON TO ENTER
A STAGE OF WORKING OUT THE TEXT OF A REDUCTION
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AGREEMENT.

EASTERN END OF ROUND XV PRESS CONFERENCE

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
(POLISH REP STRULAK)

1. Q. (REUTERS - WIELAND) COULD YOU CLARIFY FOR US YOUR
PROPOSALS ON PHASE II REDUCTIONS? IN YOUR 4TH POINT YOU
SAY THAT YOU PROPOSE THAT REDUCTION COMMITMENTS REGARDING
THE SECOND STAGE BE FORMULATED IN THE FIRST AGREEMENT ONLY
IN GENERAL TERMS. NOW, AT THE PRECEDING PRESS CONFERENCE
AMBASSADOR DE VOS SAID THAT CONTRARY TO EASTERN CLAIMS THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS DO NOT RESERVE THE MODALITIES OF
PHASE II REDUCTIONS FOR PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. WE SEEM
TO HAVE ANOTHER DISCREPANCY HERE IN THESE STATEMENTS. I
WONDER IF YOU WOULD CLARIFY FOR US WHAT YOUR PROPOSALS
SEEM TO ACHIEVE HERE?

A. I WOULD CALL IT A DIFFERENCE OF INTERPRETATION AND
JUDGMENT. TO ENABLE YOU TO FORM YOUR OWN JUDGEMENT, I WOULD
CLARIFY WHAT WE PROPOSE REGARDING COMMITMENTS OF STATES
OTHER THAN US AND SOVIET UNION REGARDING THEIR PARTICIPATION
IN REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE: IT IS THAT THEY SHOULD
GIVE US THE TIME OF THEIR REDUCTIONS WHICH INDEED THEY
HAVE PROMISED TO GIVE US IN THE APRIL 19 THE PROPOSAL AND
THE SCOPE OR AMOUNT OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. ALL OTHER MODALITIES
CONCERNING THE PHASE II OR STAGE II REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LEFT FOR
THE DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND STAGE.

2. Q. (REUTERS - WIELAND) I HAVE A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION. IF
THIS IS SO, I WONDER IF YOU WOULD EXPLAIN TO US THE
RATIONALE BEHIND THE FURTHER SOCIALIST PROPOSALS WHICH

WOULD GIVE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES THE
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST PHASE
REDUCTIONS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES AND ALSO WHETHER YOU
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WOULD TELL US UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THE SOVIET UNION
MIGHT BE INCLINED TO MAKE USE OF THIS POSSIBILITY?

A. WELL, YOU ARE ASKING ME A QUESTION WHICH GOES SOMEWHAT
INTO THE DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND I THINK I AM BOUND
BY THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS NOT TO REVEAL THEM, BUT
I WOULD ANSWER IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: YOU HAD ASKED ME IN
THE FIRST QUESTION ABOUT THE OBLIGATION OR COMMITMENTS OF
THE STATES OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION OR THE UNITED STATES
AND I HAVE GIVEN YOU THE ANSWER WHICH IS CORRECT. NOW YOU
CAN ALSO SEE FROM THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT THAT WE HAVE A
CERTAIN APPROACH TO THE REDUCTIONS AND WE BELIEVE IT WOULD
BE UNFAIR ON OUR PART NOT TO STATE HOW WE -- WHAT IS THIS
APPROACH AND THIS APPROACH CLEARLY FOR EXAMPLE INCLUDES
REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS BY ALL PARTICIPANTS. WE DO NOT
DEMAND SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS ON THAT BUT WE DO NOT HIDE, ON
THE OTHER HAND, THAT THIS WILL BE OUR APPROACH IN THE SECOND
STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. AND ALSO, WE HAVE NEVER MADE IT A
SECRET THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST STAGE
OF REDUCTIONS AND THE SECOND STAGE OF REDUCTIONS AND SO THAT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3145
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USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
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USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

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THE REDUCTIONS ARE MUTUAL AND THAT THE STATES WHO WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS SHOULD HAVE THE POSSIBILITY TO TAKE THE POSITION ON THE REDUCTIONS OF THE SECOND STAGE BECAUSE, IN OUR VIEW THE REDUCTIONS THAT THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE IN THE FIRST STAGE WOULD BE ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE REDUCTIONS OF THE SECOND STAGE WILL FOLLOW.

3. Q. (LOS ANGELES TIMES - COOK) I WOULD LIKE TO ASK A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE FIGURES. MY FIRST QUESTION: WHY HAS IT TAKEN FIVE YEARS FOR THE WARSAW PACT SIDE TO AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY ON BOTH SIDES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SECOND QUESTION IS: YOUR REDUCTION FIGURES - 105,000 FOR WARSAW PACT AND 91,000 FOR NATO - THAT'S A DIFFERENCE OF 16,000 (SIC)? IS IT YOUR CONTENTION THAT THIS 16,000 (SIC) IS THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IN THE SIZE OF FORCES OF EACH SIDE NOW THAT YOU HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY?

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A. YES, FIRST THE QUESTION ABOUT THE FIVE YEARS WHICH IT SUPPOSEDLY TOOK US TO AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY. I WOULDN'T SAY SO. I WOULD SAY IF YOU FOLLOWED OUR POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CLOSELY, YOU WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING WE OPERATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE EXISTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AN APPROXIMATE EQUAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA DESIGNATED FOR REDUCTIONS AND THAT BY REDUCING THE FORCES OF VARIOUS STATES BY EQUAL PERCENTAGES, WHICH WAS THE MATTER ADVOCATED FROM THE BEGINNING AS IT IS NOW, THIS APPROXIMATE EQUAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WOULD BE MAINTAINED. IT IS RECENTLY, IN OUR LATEST PROPOSALS, THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO THE PARITY TO BE EXPRESSED IN THE FORM OF COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AT 900,000 FOR THE ARMED FORCES -- AIR AND GROUND FORCES COMBINED -- AND 700,000 FOR THE GROUND FORCES. AND SO WE HAVE ACCEPTED THE CONCRETE FORM OF EXPRESSING PARITY AS SUGGESTED BY THE WEST. BUT I WOULDN'T SAY THAT FOR ALL THOSE FIVE YEARS WE HAVE BEEN AGAINST PARITY. WE WEREN'T AGAINST PARITY.

NOW, THE SECOND QUESTION. AS FAR AS THE OFFICIAL FIGURES OF BOTH SIDES, THIS IS THE DIFFERENCE.

4. Q. (POLISH PRESS AGENCY - RAYSACHER) MR. AMBASSADOR, YOU

STATED AT THE BEGINNING OF YOUR STATEMENT THAT THIS LAST ROUND HAS BEEN AN INTERESTING AND PRODUCTIVE ONE, BUT AT THE END OF YOUR STATEMENT THERE WAS A REMARK THAT PERHAPS THE PARTICIPANTS COULD BE ABLE TO MOVE TO A STAGE OF PRACTICAL WORK ON THE TEXT OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT AND WOULD YOU AGREE THAT SUCH AN ACTION WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST WHICH ARE NOW, AS EVERYBODY KNOWS, NOT SO GREAT?

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A. WELL, INDEED THAT WAS THE IDEA WHICH I WISHED TO CONVEY IN MY STATEMENT WHICH YOU SAY ABOUT YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE COMPLICATIONS IN THE EAST/WEST RELATIONS. IT IS NO SECRET TO ANYONE AND ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THOSE RELATIONS IS BADLY NEEDED. AND ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS NOW I THINK IT HAS BECOME AN AXIOM THAT THE ROAD TO BETTERMENT OF THESE RELATIONS SHOULD GO THROUGH DISARMAMENT MEASURES. NOW WHAT WE ARE NEGOTIATING HERE IN VIENNA ARE DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND THEY ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THE WISH, THE DESIRE TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL AND IN EUROPE IN PARTICULAR WAS ONE OF THE MOTIVES BEHIND OUR PROPOSALS PRESENTED LAST JUNE. ONE MAY ALSO SAY THAT THE ROAD TO MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE IS THROUGH VIENNA -- THROUGH AN AGREEMENT IN VIENNA AND IF AND WHEN WE ARE ABLE TO REGISTER AN ACCORD IN VIENNA THIS WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO DISARMAMENT IN OTHER AREAS OF OUR CONTINENT IN OTHER FIELDS WHICH OF COURSE IS THE THING NEEDED TOO. ANY WAY, I FULLY AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT NOW IS THE TIME REALLY TO ARRIVE AT AGREEMENT IN VIENNA, TO REGISTER PROGRESS, THE OVERALL EFFECT WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN EVER AND IS MORE NECESSARY THAN EVER.

END OF PRESS CONFERENCE
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